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RECENT DECISIONS
ALIENS - EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE - Cabell v. Chavez Salido, 50
U.S.L.W. 4095 (Jan. 12, 1982).
Appellees, legally admitted resident aliens of the United States,
filed suit for injunctive relief against officials of the County of Los An-
geles, California, contending that rejection of their applications for em-
ployment as deputy probation officers violated their rights under the
Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment.' The parties
stipulated that rejection of two applications for deputy probation of-
ficer was based solely on a California law' that provided that only
United States citizens may serve as peace officers, a catgeory that in-
cludes the position of deputy probation officer. A three judge district
court found the statute unconstitutional on its face and as applied.8
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judg-
ment and remanded to the district court for reconsideration in light of
Foley v. Connelie4 and Ambach v. Norwich.5 Foley upheld a New York
statute providing a citizenship requirement for state troopers and
Ambach held that a state may refuse to employ aliens who have chosen
not to seek naturalization as elementary and secondary school teachers.
On remand, the district court found its previous decision valid. On this
appeal, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed.
Justice White's majority opinion found the application of the
strict scrutiny standard of review with respect to legally admitted resi-
dent aliens improper. White distinguished restrictions serving eco-
nomic as opposed to political functions, and reasoned that the differen-
tiation utilized by California fulfilled its political functions. "While not
retreating from the position that restrictions on lawfully resident aliens
that primarily affect economic interests are subject to heightened scru-
tiny.., we have concluded that strict scrutiny is out of place when the
restriction primarily serves a political function . .. ."I
The Court applied the two-tiered analysis described in Sugarman
v. Dougall:7 first, the specificity of the classification was examined to
ascertain whether it was sufficiently tailored to serve legitimate politi-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4.
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1031(a) (West 1980).
3. Chavez Salido v. Cabell, 427 F. Supp. 158 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
4. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
5. 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
6. Cabell, 50 U.S.L.W. at 4097.
7. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
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cal ends, then, the classification must be one that involves discretion to
formulate decisions and execute policies in a way that substantially af-
fects individuals in the community.
The Court concluded that the statute was substantially tailored to
legitimate political ends since each of the positions categorized as
peace officers involves law enforcement responsibilities and that states
may choose to limit delegation of coercive police powers over individu-
als to United States citizens. Justice White's opinion conceded that
some positions within the peace officer classification were questionable,
but declined to hold the statute facially defective. The classification
was not precisely drawn, yet was substantially tailored to meet legiti-
mate governmental ends. Specifically addressing the position of deputy
probation officers, the Court conceded that these officers exercise au-
thority over a narrowly limited range of individuals, but the authority
would be comprehensive, coercive and often discretionary. Justice
White further observed:
From the prospective of the probationer, his probation of-
ficer may personify the state's sovereign powers; from the per-
spective of the larger community, the probation officer may
symbolize the political community's control over, and thus re-
sponsibility for, those who have been found to have violated
the norms of social order. From both of these perspectives, a
citizenship requirement may seem an appropriate limitation on
those who would exercise and, therefore, symbolize this power
of the political community over those who fall within its
jurisdiction. 8
In a dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the proper standard of
review was applied by the district court. He reasoned that since
Sugarman, state discrimination against aliens should be strictly scruti-
nized to determine whether the articulated end is a substantial govern-
mental objective, and whether the means are necessary and precisely
drawn toward that end. Applying this standard, Justice Blackmun
found the statute facially defective. He contended that the statute was
cavalierly drafted, and was overinclusive and underinclusive. Further-
more, he observed that the coercive duties of a deputy probation officer
do not justify its unavailability to aliens because, in defined circum-
stances, all private citizens, including aliens, may exercise the power of
arrest. Moreover, the power of deputy probation officers is exercised
over a narrowly defined group of individuals and the discretion exer-
cised by such officers is narrowly curtailed by statute and the authority
of others. Justice Blackmun concluded:
8. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4099.
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California's exclusion of these appellees from the position
of deputy probation officer stems solely from state parochial-
ism and hostility toward foreigners who have come to this
country lawfully. I find it ironic that the Court invokes the
principle of democratic self-government to exclude from the
law enforcement process individuals who have not only resided
here lawfully, but who now desire merely to help the State en-
force its laws. Section 1031(a) violates appellees' rights to equal
treatment and an individualized determination of fitness.'
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT - PACKAGE - LIMITATION OF LIARILITY
-Smythgreyhound v. M/V "Eurygenes", 666 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981).
Appellants filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York against appellees to recover cargo losses
incurred when the vessel M/V Eurygenes, while en route from Japan to
Europe, caught fire and caused damage to appellant's cargo. This ac-
tion was transferred to the Southern District of New York and consoli-
dated with other actions arising out of the fire. A settlement and con-
sent decree was entered with respect to some of the claimants. One
issue which remained unresolved, however, was the amount of recovery
allowed for damages to three shipments, made by Universal Electric
Merchandise Co., consisting of stereo equipment packed in containers.
Section 4(5) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) limits re-
covery to five hundred dollars per package, unless a description of the
item and its value appeared on the bill of lading.1 Here, the stereo
equipment was initially packaged in cartons, but upon loading, the car-
rier packaged them in containers. The bill of lading only indicated the
number of cartons and containers.
Appellants maintained that the term "package" referred to each
carton, while appellees maintained that the word referred to the con-
tainers in which the cartoned equipment was shipped. The district
court referred the issue to Magistrate Raby. The Magistrate concluded
that the parties intended each carton to constitute the COGSA "pack-
age." The district court rejected the Magistrate's findings, but found
that the limitation applied to the containers. It held that the shipper
9. Id. at 4103.
1. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1976).
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